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4th March 2001

CONTROLLING A VIRAL INFECTION

Mr. P.S. D'Knim


 

Analogue
Corporation

To: Director of Immunity Technology.

From: Director of Silicon Resources.

Report: Controlling a viral infection in the NH Unit.

The effects of the virus were first noticed on Jan 19th 2001 when stand-alone PC013/NH2 was seen to be experiencing a profound stuttering and vibration of the power supply ventilation fan. The speed of the device also fluctuated up and down.

First checks by the NH2 Module Technician also recorded a shut down of modem activity, a five degree rise in CPU core temperature and a suspension of normal multi-tasking ability. Overall the system slowed to about 30% of normal speed.

Within an hour, repeated rasping noises of an irregular pattern were heard from the sound card. Temporary stability in this area was only restored by removing the sound card and washing its connections in salted hot water. In addition, it was found that re-insertion of the card was only possible by applying benyl-propyl red lubricating syrup to the ISA socket. To control the rasping it was found necessary to repeat this operation up to four times a day for 12 days, from the first outbreak of symptoms until normal service was resumed.

During the early days of the fever the external casework became unusually cold to the touch; cold enough for condensation to form on it. This was removed with dry tissue and cleaning wipes.

By day 2 of the infection the case internals were seen to be both flexing rhythmically and reddened in appearance, instead of the normal steely greyish-blue. Although continuing to function at a reduced level, the system showed evidence of confusion with handling data. In particular, most inputs to the floppy-drive were rejected. Error messages such as "Unrecognised Format" were commonly encountered.

After some trial and error it was found that the best way to support the system was to attach it to the adjacent stand-alone system, (PC013a), by means of a laplink cable and run the TLC diagnostics program. This provided valuable feedback as to where and when new symptoms were developing. In between diagnostic sessions the laplink arrangement was used to drip-feed DN (data-nutrient) solution to the weakened system. Following these administrations the virised machine was allowed to lapse into standby mode, with the screen saver being the only externally visible sign of life. Toward the end of day 2, the adjacent system was employed to surf the net for technical support. Four system stability sites were found to yield useful advice and curative software. These were Doctor.sol, Sophie.com, P-nort.uti, and McAnti.com.

From an assessment of the symptom complex and using the pooled FAQ databases on the sites, it was concluded that the infection was a simultaneous attack by the "Bucking Bronchio" virus, (which, alone, generally affects the power supply & CPU fans), and a variant of the ULF macro environmental virus (which, alone, normally only causes creaking and inflammation of the case internals). The former virus is normally acquired via the air-inlet grille to the power supply. Recent maintenance work to the NH building's ventilation ducting - the outlet is directly above PC013 - is therefore posited as a possible source of the BB virus. Although still apparently serviceable, the filter gauze to the power supply grille on "013" was promptly changed.

At the beginning of Day 3 the technicians attempted to raise the level of support by diverting some of the "laplink" output in the TLC data stream to the Audio-In port on the sound card. This resulted in the display of "system error" dialogue boxes, variously indicating that inputs to this location, although normally acceptable, would at this time result in a stack overflow of .ARC, .ARG, and .ARJ files, causing "out of memory" errors in the middle cache buffer. Secondary messages suggested that this scenario might in turn cause a displacement of .WMF material to Audio-Out and a possible corruption of the BIOS, (Body Input Output System). The system help file wizard suggested that only .CKR and .TEA type data would be acceptable in the then system state.

At the end of Day 3 the curative software ErythroMice-In.exe was downloaded to the adjacent support PC. Following web-site advice, this software was set to run four times a day from inside the Win Event Scheduler. Forty-eight hours later it was noted that the inflammation and flexing of the case internals had subsided, although signs of stress were still evidenced by TLC diagnostics reporting occasional spontaneous bouts of .YUK and .NAU files being written to the Win\Temp folder, followed by the progressive overwriting of the Dr. Watson system software utility. Fortunately, this application is not system critical.

Over the next 9 days, with the support of the above mentioned palliative treatments, the system's native infection control processes overcame the twin viral attack. Error log files were regularly generated and sent to the parallel port controller from where they were Xeeeeeroxed to A4 tissue in the printer.

The system is now back to working at maximum output level.

Environmental Implications:

The episode did not cause any deviation from the Company's environment & recycling policy. The basement waste-paper recycling unit coped with an increase in tissue and print output 60% above normal. This shows the benefit of setting up our systems to the UK(British) operating system settings with the composting option rather than the US(English) option which permits uncontrolled waste to be dispersed to open trash cans (Microsoft Technical Bulletin # Win 98/nov/flo/2000/BW refers).

Recommendations:

  • The efficacy of the TLC Diagnostics Suite of programs was again demonstrated. Continued subscription to this software and its updates is advised. Without it we would not be able to pinpoint those component areas requiring support in the event of infection.
  • Continued subscription to the above named anti-viral support organisations is recommended.
  • The procedure whereby an adjacent stand-alone PC unit is used to support the infected PC should be incorporated into revised operational guidelines.
  • Field service intervals for power supply filter units be reduced from 3 months to 2.
  • All ventilation ducting in the NH building be vapour sterilised.

Conclusion: The current strategy of maintaining many non-networked PCs was vindicated.

Eat more fruit.

P.S. D'Knim. (Director)

* All rights to trademarks of the respective equipment suppliers is acknowledged.